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Introduction. Constitutionalism and the Way to Complexity: Why Decision Making Needs Updating
The advent of constitutionalism brought about substantial simplification with regard to the status of individuals by inventing citizenship as a unifying factor.1 Conversely, as far as decision making is concerned, constitutionalism has unequivocally meant more complexity due to the adoption of pluralism as the very foundation of democratic government: unlike in the preconstitutional era, decisions were no longer taken by one but by many, according to pre-defined rules and controlled by the judiciary. Institutional pluralism was developed both horizontally and vertically, i.e. through division of powers between different bodies and organs, and between different levels of government, respectively. Democratic decision making is the backbone of constitutionalism. Decisions are legitimate only if taken by bodies and according to procedures, directly or indirectly accountable to the people. Such accountability has normally taken the form of direct or representative democracy, whereby the latter has progressively prevailed alongside the development of ever more sophisticated institutional arrangements.2
In more recent times, two factors have begun to cast doubt on this simple scheme.3 First, population growth, better education and the resulting greater will of individuals and interest groups to participate actively have made the 4 Thus the phenomena of "Blame Shifting", i.e. the opportunity for decision-makers to avoid accountability for decisions influenced by other governments, as described by R.K. Weaver, "The Politics of Blame Avoidance" (1986) traditional forms of representative and direct democracy increasingly unsatisfactory to more people. Elected assemblies are perceived as less and less representative and were in fact conceived of at a time when few were allowed to vote and assemblies served as platforms to reach compromises between a small elite of aristocrats and bourgeoisie. At the same time, direct democratic tools such as referenda and popular initiatives prove to be rudimentary instruments, often in the hands of mobilized minorities, most unfit to regulate increasingly complex issues, which often require specialized knowledge and can rarely be reduced to a "yes" or a "no". Disaffection with politics, the decreasing role of political parties, increasingly recurring protests and several other symptoms of popular discontent about the political process are therefore the outcome of structural and systemic factors rather than of lower quality of political elites. The latter phenomenon -to the extent it exists -is a consequence rather than the cause of growing heterogeneity, more independent thinking and greater democratic consciousness of people. Second, contemporary constitutionalism has required institutions and procedures to become increasingly complex and sophisticated. While necessary to adapt a relatively simple institutional and procedural machinery -such as that based on the separation of legislative, executive and judicial power -to growing challenges, such complexity inevitably makes democratic control more difficult, adds layers of government and decisional instances, sometimes mixes up the realms of the various powers and dilutes accountability.4 Such phenomena are not necessarily negative, as sometimes decisions can in fact be more transparent and accountable.5 In any event, such complexity is inherent to the complexity of society (for instance, the technical norms on a number of highly complicated and specialized issues) and even to the very basic democratic need to control and limit power: examples can range from the establishment
